The New York and Federal Constitutional Standards in Relation to Governmental Aid to Private Education by Kaney, Helen M.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 18 Number 3 Article 7 
4-1-1969 
The New York and Federal Constitutional Standards in Relation to 
Governmental Aid to Private Education 
Helen M. Kaney 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Education Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Helen M. Kaney, The New York and Federal Constitutional Standards in Relation to Governmental Aid to 
Private Education, 18 Buff. L. Rev. 526 (1969). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol18/iss3/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
COMMENTS
THE NEW YORK AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARDS IN RELATION TO GOVERNMENTAL
AID TO PRIVATE EDUCATION
I. INTRODUCTION
American educational processes are under varied attack from many sectors.
The recent disorders on numerous university campuses have shocked the national
conscience. The teacher's strikes, the accusations of inferior education in pre-
dominantly Negro schools, the problem of de facto segregation in our schools
have all etched a turbulent outline of American education in recent years. Amid
all these grave problems indigenous to 20th century America, we are again facing
squarely a recurring problem as exemplified in a recent New York Statute:'
alleged public support of sectarian schools in which the tenets and doctrines of
a particular religion are inculcated in students. What is right and proper within
the realm of church-state relations concerning education is the basic problem
to be analyzed here. All state constitutions include provisions designed to keep
separate the functions of church and state.2 These provisions may be thought of
as a more precise expression of what is embodied within the first amendment of
the Constitution of the United States.
We have in the United States two parallel systems of education: private
and public. In New York alone, 2]1.5% of the total state enrollment attends non-
public schools.3 The numbers of nonpublic school students are significant and so
are the problems of providing competitive, quality education for these students.
Today, not only are local tax revenues, state, and federal moneys being used to
defray the expense of public education, but recent legislation has extended aid
within the sectarian school sphere.4
This involvement of the state and federal governments with private schools
raises questions under the state5 and federal constitutions concerning separation
of church and state. It is the purpose of this comment to analyze the New York
1. L. 1965, c. 320, § 1 to be § 701 of the Education Law, effective Sept. 1, 1966.
2. For various types of constitutional provisions see So Yale LJ. 917, 920-21 (1941),
Note, Public Funds For Sectarian Schools, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 793, 794 (1947).
3. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 n.9.
4. N.Y. Education Law § 701 (1966). This is the New York Textbook Loan Law which
furnishes books to all students in grades seven through twelve regardless of what school they
attend. Title I and II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 27,
20 U.S.C. § 241 et seq. (Supp. 1966). Title I establishes a program of financial assistance to
local educational agencies for the education of low income families. Title II involves federal
grants for the acquisition of school library resources, textbooks and other printed and
published instructional materials for the use of children and teachers in public and private
schools.
5. N.Y. Const. art. XI, § 3.
6. U.S. Const. amend. I.
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Constitution and the Federal Constitution to determine what constitutional stan-
dards are applied to legislation authorizing the expenditure of public funds for
education including private education.
II. NE w YoRK CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE XI, SEc. 3
The New York State Text-Book Loan Law7 permits local school boards,
upon individual request, to loan school books8 to all children in grades seven
through twelve regardless of what school they attend. This law has brought
into sharp focus the whole controversy revolving around Article XI, section 3,
of the New York State Constitution popularly known as the Blaine Amendment,
which provides:
Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall use its property or
credit or any public money... directly or indirectly, in aid or main-
tenance ... of any school or institution of learning wholly or in part
under the control or direction of any religious denomination, or in which
any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught .... 9
Article XI, section 3 of the New York Constitution expressly prohibits the
state from directly'0 or indirectly"x aiding any sectarian school. This constitu-
tional prohibtion was the culmination of an historic separation of government
and religion. As early as 1805, the New York State Legislature provided for the
establishment of free schools in New York City for poor children. It was spe-
cifically provided that these funds could not be used in educating children who
were taught by any religious society.12 In 1842, the Legislature specifically barred
schools which taught religious or sectarian doctrines from receiving any public
money.'8 In an effort to further clarify the status of denominational schools which
taught doctrines and tenets of one sect, the legislature passed another law in 1844
which provided not only that schools which taught doctrines of one particular
sect were not to receive any public moneys, but also schools which used books
that favored one religion over another or contained materials prejudicial to any
religion were barred from obtaining state moneys.14 In 1853, a group of New
7. L. 1965, c. 320 to be § 701 of the Educational Law, effective Sept. 1, 1966.
8. Id. § 701(1)
"A text-book, for the purposes of this section shall mean a book which a pupil is required
to use as a text for a semester or more in a particular class in the school he legally attends."
9. N.Y. Const. art. XI, § 3 permits examination or inspection of sectarian schools and
authorizes the legislature to provide school transportation for children attending any school.
10. Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200, 212, 15 N.E.2d 576, 582 (1938). The
Court of Appeals defined directly in the Blaine Amendment as aid:
[flurnished in a direct line, both literally and figuratively, to the school itself,
unmistakably earmarked, and without circumlocution or ambiguity.
11. Id. at 211, 15 N.E.2d at 582. The Court defined indirect aid as follows:
Aid furnished "indirectly" clearly embraces any contribution, to whomever so made,
circuitously, collaterally, disguised, or otherwise not in a straight, open and direct
course for the open and avowed aid of the school, that may be the benefit of
the institution or promotional of its interests and purposes.
12. L. 1805, ch. 108.
13. L. 1842, ch. 150, § 14.
14. L. 1844, ch. 320, § 12.
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York citizens belonging to a particular sect petitioned the legislature to authorize
the use of money from the common school fund to establish schools in which
religion was to be taught. The legislative committee to which the petition was
addressed rejected it, reasoning that implementation of such a program would
open the door to dangerous and vicious controversy among different religious
groups as to who would get what shares of the public money.1 This action
demonstrates that as early as 1853 there was general agreement that the laws
of the state prohibited public support of religiously oriented schools.
Judd v. Board of Education'6 dealt directly with the Blaine Amendment.
Plaintiffs, as taxpayers, instituted a suit against the board of education of their
school district challenging the board's action under section 206 of the Education
Law. This provision authorized the use of public funds to defray the expense of
transporting pupils to and from private or religiously controlled schools. Plain-
tiffs contended that the law violated Article IX, section 3. The Court of Appeals,
three judges dissenting, held that the law permitting the transportation of chil-
dren at public expense to a denominational school did violate the New York
Constitution.17 The court concluded that the furnishing of transportation to
pupils of private and parochial schools was aid or support of the schools and
was therefore forbidden by the state constitution.
The purpose of the transportation is to promote the interests of the
private school or religious or sectarian institution that controls and
directs it .... Without pupils there could be no school. It is illogical
to say that the furnishing of transportation is not an aid to the insti-
tution while the employment of teachers and furnishing of books,
accommodations and other facilities are such an aid.' 8
An argument, invoked by the defendant, but completely rejected by the court,
was the so-called "child benefit doctrine."' 9 Defendant argued that the assistance
given was primarily for the benefit of the child and that any benefit conferred
15. Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200, 208, 15 N.E.2d 576, 581 (1938).
16. 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938).
17. The constitution was amended the following year to provide specifically for school
bus transportation for all children regardless of the schools they attended.
18. Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200, 212, 15 N.E.2d 576, 582 (1938).
19. The Child Benefit Doctrine was first upheld in Borden v. Louisiana State Board of
Education, 168 La. 1005, 1020, 123 So. 655, 660-61 (1929).
The appropriations were made for the specific purpose of purchasing school books
for the use of the school children of the state, free of cost to them. It was for their
benefit and the resulting benefit to the state that the appropriations were made.
True, these children attend some school, public or private, the latter, sectarian or
non-sectarian, and the books are to be furnished them for their use, free of cost,
whichever they attend. The schools, however, are not the beneficiaries of these appro-
priations. They obtain nothing from them, nor are they relieved of a single obliga-
tion, because of them. The school children and the state alone are the beneficiaries.
This case was immediately followed by Cochran v. Louisiana State Board oj Education,
281 U.S. 370 (1930), which also accepted the Child Benefit Theory. This case went up to
the United States Supreme Court only on the issue of whether the act in question au-
thorized the taking of private property for a private purpose and thus violated the 14th
amendment. No first amendment, establishment of religion issue, was involved nor any
issue involving the act's alleged violation of the Louisiana Constitution.
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on the institution the child attended was secondary and therefore not proscribed
by Article XI, section 3. The court rejected the "child benefit doctrine" sum-
marily.
The present textbook loan law is not the first attempt in this state to supply
books to all school children regardless of the school they attend. The legislature
enacted a law in 1917, which had a purpose similar to that of the present law.
20
The earlier statute included school supplies as well as textbooks and was there-
fore broader than the present law. The statute was attacked in the case of Smith
v. Donahue.21 The appellate division held that the statute violated the Blaine
Amendment. It reasoned that if the aid was not direct it was certainly indirect
aid to parochial schools. 22 The court also stated that such indirect aid to sectarian
schools "if not in actual violation of the words, it is a violation of the true intent
and meaning of the Constitution and in consequence equally unconstitutional.1 23
The constitutionality of the present textbook loan law was recently tested
in the New York courts. In a 4 to 3 decision, the Court of Appeals 24 held that
the law did not violate section 3 of Article XI of the New York State Constitu-
tion. The majority reasoned that the New York Constitution prohibits the ex-
penditure of public funds to aid religiously affiliated schools but that this was
not the situation presented by the Textbook Loan Law. In the Court's opinion,
the law did provide for some incidental benefit to parochial schools but such
benefit could not be designated as direct or indirect aid because the legislature
in enacting this statute had no intention of assisting parochial schools. The legis-
lature sought only to benefit all school children regardless of the kind of school
they attended.
What the Court really seems to be saying is that the State's interest in
uplifting education is so great that it overrides constitutional obstacles in certain
instances. Since many children in New York attend parochial schools, their edu-
cational opportunities in certain areas are a proper object of state aid. The Court
did try to limit the aid by designating it as incidental aid and also by stating
that "certain types of aid can be made available to all children.125 But where
the Court in the future will draw the line between incidental aid and direct or
indirect aid is unknown.
Judge Van Voorhis, speaking for the three judge minority in Allen cited the
Judd"- and Smith27 cases as being decisive of the issues before the Court. In
20. Laws of 1917, ch. 786.
To provide textbooks or other supplies to all the children attending the schools of
such cities in which free textbooks or other supplies are lawfully provided ....
(formerly N.Y. Education Law § 868(4).
21. 202 App. Div. 656, 195 N.Y.S. 715 (3d Dep't 1922).
22. Id. at 661, 195 N.Y.S. at 719.
23. Id. at 664, 195 N.Y.S. at 722.
24. Board of Education v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d 799
(1967).
25. Id. at 117, 281 NY.S.2d at 804, 228 N.E.2d at 794 (1967).
26. Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938). The Court of
Appeals in the Allen case specifically overruled Judd.
27. Smith v. Donahue, 202 App. Div. 656, 195 N.Y.S. 715 (3d Dep't 1922).
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those cases, the Court of Appeals had refused to accept the contention that trans-
portation and textbooks may be supplied to private school children by the state
and not violate Article XI, section 3 of the New York Constitution. These "aids"
contravened the language and intent of the constitutional prohibition concern-
ing public money being used directly or indirectly to aid or maintain any paro-
chial school. The minority in Allen 8 found no basic change in the factors con-
sidered in Judd and Smith since these cases were decided and therefore was of
the opinion that the present textbook loan law was unconstitutional.
The minority stated that Article XI, Section 3 of the New York Constitu-
tion and the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution have the same pur-
pose:
... to keep religion from being dominated by government and to pre-
vent government from being dominated by pressure groups seeking to
control it for the promotion of religion.29
While this is perhaps not an all encompassing statement of the purpose of the
two constitutional provisions, it is at least a partial formalization. Having framed
this statement of purpose, Judge Van Voorhis then examined the law under
consideration and focused on the requirement that the books supplied must be
secular as opposed to religious. The minority declared that there was no reliable
standard under which secular and religious texts may be differentiated and there-
fore if this law was implemented, religious schools would apply pressure on the
state to supply books which were in accord with their views of such secular sub-
jects as the Spanish Inquisition, evolution, and economics. The minority also
envisioned the state as responding to such pressure and ultimately dominating
the churches.A0 To support this position, the minority relied heavily on Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson's concurring opinion in McCollum v. Board of Education,81 which
elucidated the problem of separating out all religious influence from subjects
taught in school. Judge Van Voorhis stated that one of the important reasons
for the existence of parochial schools was the desire of the members of a church
to have their children indoctrinated with the church's point of view on a variety
of subjects.
In essence, the minority is saying that religious schools exist to implant
certain views and textbooks are the central means of effectuating this purpose.
If the state loans textbooks to parochial school children, it will set up a conflict
between the state and the religion which operates the school. The prevention of
such a conflict is what the respective provisions in the state and federal consti-
tutions were designed to effect.
28. Board of Education v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d 799
(1967).
29. Id. at 121, 228 N.E.2d at 797, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
30. Id. at 123, 228 N.E.2d at 798, 281 N.Y.2d at 810.
31. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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11. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION: FIRST AMENDMENT
The New York law also directly raises basic problems under the first amend-
ment of the United States Constitution which provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof...
The first amendment contains a two-pronged prohibition on governmental32
power in the field of religion. In recent cases, the Supreme Court has differen-
tiated between the two clauses and applied them independently.3 3 In probing
the constitutional limits of aid to education, the establishment clause is the
primary constitutional standard. 34
The meaning of the establishment clause in the area of education was re-
cently interpreted in Everson v. Board of Education.3 5 This case concerned a
New Jersey statute which authorized the expenditure of public funds for bus
transportation of children attending public and private, nonprofit, schools. The
statute was challenged in so far as it authorized reimbursement of parents of
children attending sectarian schools for the expense of bus transportation. The
Supreme Court in a 5 to 4 decision held that the statute did not violate the first
amendment nor did it violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 0 Mr. Justice Black writing for the majority stated:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion... over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or dis-
belief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to sup-
port any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
32. The first amendment was originally applied only to the federal government, but
more recently it has been made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
See, e.g., Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1, 8 (1947); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 309 (1952); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 423, 430 (1962).
33. The older cases were in terms of religious rights being safeguarded by the first
amendment. See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1878). The court now analyzes each clause separately. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
34. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
[While the two clauses of the first amendment] may in certain instances overlap,
they forbid two quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious
freedom. The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not
depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated
by enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate
directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not. (Emphasis added.)
35. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
36. Petitioners contended that tax-raised funds were being used for a private purpose
and therefore the fourteenth amendment was violated.
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participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and
vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment
of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between
Church and State."37
The majority assumed the New Jersey statute to be a public welfare mea-
sure whose benefits could not be denied to some citizens on account of their
faith. The Court stated that under the establishment clause New Jersey cannot
"contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches the
tenets and faith of any church."3 8 However, the Court mentions the free exer-
cise clause as prohibiting penalizing a citizen because of his religion by excluding
him from the benefits of public welfare legislation. This use of the free exercise
clause rationale seems to avoid entirely the issue of whether this statute consti-
tutes an establishment of religion. The Court did not actually designate which
clause of the first amendment it relied on in deciding the case.3 9 Yet, the first
part of the opinion was devoted to the historical basis of the establishment
clause4" which was the clause under which petitioners challenged the statute.
The majority recognized that there might have been incidental benefit to the
parochial schools from this legislation 4 ' but the Court analogized this benefit
to that received under general governmental services: police and fire protection,
sewage disposal, and public highways and sidewalks. The Court in Everson may
be saying that in fact there is an incidental aid to religion but that the state's
interest in protecting school children on their way to and from school justifies
it.42 Mr. Justice Black employed the child benefit doctrine under which legisla-
tion achieving a public purpose such as furthering education is constitutional
even though it incidentally aids religion.43 The two dissenting judges in Everson
relied on the absolute approach to the first amendment and therefore found a
violation of the establishment clause. 44
37. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
38. Id. at 16.
39. Id. at 17.
[Wie cannot say that the First Amendment prohibits New Jersey from spending
tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part of ageneral program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public and other
schools.
40. Id. at 8-16.
41. Id. at 17. The Court realizes that this statute helps children to attend church
schools and may in some cases make it possible for some children to go to sectarian
schools who would not otherwise do so if their parents had to incur the expense of their
transportation.
42. Black's own definition of what the establishment clause means [supra note 37) is in
opposition to the result in this case. He could not have applied his absolute test and arrived
at the conclusion that there was no establishment. See generally Note, The Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause: Conflict or Coordination, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 929 (1964).
43. See also, Cochran v Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930). The
Court upheld the furnishing of secular textbooks to children in private and parochial
schools with state tax funds. No first amendment issues were raised however.
44. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 24 (1947). Mr. Justice Jackson dis-
misses the child benefit theory summarily. He outlines the primary role of Catholic educa-
tion for the continuance of the Church and concludes:
The prohibition against establishment of religion cannot be circumvented by a
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The clear cut secular interest in education in Everson is not present in other
establishment cases. Three recent Supreme Court cases45 dealing with laws or
regulations providing for religious instruction or exercises during the public
school day did not survive attacks based on the establishment clause. The Court
concluded in each of these cases that aid to religion was involved plus an effort
to utilize the machinery of government in influencing religious adherence. In
these cases, the state could not show a sufficient secular reason for enacting laws
which aided religion in some form.46 In Abington v. Schempp,47 Mr. Justice Clark
elucidates a test for deciding whether a law runs afoul of the establishment clause.
[W]hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If
either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment
exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Consti-
tution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establish-
ment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.48
Various state courts have ruled on the constitutionality of state laws which
have provided for the furnishing of textbooks to children attending private
schools.49 The Supreme Court 5° has recently squarely faced the question of
subsidy, bonus, or reimbursement of expense to individuals for receiving religious
instruction and indoctrination. (330 U.S. at 33).
In Mr. Justice Rutledge's view the establishment clause effects a total prohibition on any
aid to religion.
The prohibition broadly forbids state support, financial or other, of religion in any
guise, form or degree. It outlaws all use of public funds for religious purposes.
45. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1947). Public school children
whose parents so requested were released from their normal classes once a week to attend
religion classes conducted in the public schools by reprsentatives of various religious denom-
ination. Non-attending pupils were kept in school. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
State officials composed a denominationally neutral prayer and required it to be recited at
the beginning of each school day. Pupils could remain silent or be excused from the class-
room during the recitation of the prayer. Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The
State required the schools to begin each day with a reading from the Bible. Pupils again
could absent themselves from the classroom during this time on written request from their
parents.
46. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). The Supreme Court held constitutional
a New York released time statute which provided for religious instruction outside the public
school building. This case is contrary to the above cited cases supra note 45. No secular
purpose was demonstrated by the state. Even though no tax funds were directly used to
support the program, McCollum strongly suggests that any released time program utilizing
the machinery of compulsory public school attendance is objectionable from a first amend-
ment view. Furthermore, the element of compulsion may be present since a child who does
not participate in the religion classes is retained in public school.
47. 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963). The Supreme Court has unequivocally rejected the idea
that the establishment clause merely prohibits governmental preference of one religion over
another.
48. Id. at 222.
49. The provision of free textbooks to children attending sectarian schools was upheld
on the theory that the aid was to the child and not to the school. See Chance v. Mississippi
State Textbook Rating and Purchasing Bd., 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941); Borden
v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929). Other courts have
held that such statutes were an unconstitutional aid to religious schools. See Dickman
v. School District No. 62 C, 232 Ore. 238, 366 P.2d 533 (1961), cert. denied 371 U.S. 823
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whether a New York statute providing for the furnishing of textbooks to all
children in grades seven through twelve is a law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The highest New York court, as
discussed in the preceding section of this comment, found no violation of either
the state or federal constitutions.51 The Supreme Court, three judges dissenting
held that the New York law was not a law respecting an establishment of religion
nor did it prohibit anyone from exercising his religion. 2 The majority recognized
that between state neutrality and state support of religion, the line is hazy,
wrapped in the shrouds of history and the predeterminations of man. The con-
stitutional standard in regard to establishment: separation of Church and State, 8
is succinct and none too illuminating. Mr. Justice White, speaking for the major-
ity in Allen, applied the Schempp test5 4 which distinguishes between those con-
tacts with religion which are permissible under the establishment clause and those
which violate the constitutional mandate of the first amendment. The legislative
purpose of the statute is to enhance the educational opportunities of the children
of the state.55 That education is a valid area of interest for the state under public
welfare ideas is not to be denied.56 The primary effect of the law is to put free"
-secular textbooks 58 into the hands of all the children in the state who are in the
prescribed grades. The textbooks loaned must either be ones chosen for use in
any public, elementary or secondary school in the state or approved by any board
(1962) ; Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 236 P.2d 949 (1951) ; Smith v. Donahue, 202 App. Div.
656, 195 N.Y.S. 715 (3d Dep't 1922).
50. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236.
51. Board of Education v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d 799
(1967). The court in a 4 to 3 decision held that the statute did not give aid to parochial
schools and therefore no establishment of religion problem was involved. The court char-
acterized the law as a public welfare measure aimed at improving the quality of education
of all children in the state. Board of Education v. Allen, 27 A.D.2d 69, 276 N.Y.S.2d 234
(3d Dep't 1966); the Appellate Division reversed the trial court solely on the issue of
plaintiff's standing to sue Board of Education v. Allen, 51 Misc. 297, 273 N.Y.S.2d 239
(1966), the trial court held that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the case and that the
statute violated Art. XI, § 3 of the N.Y. Constitution. In dicta, the court also stated that
the statute violates both the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment.
52. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). The Court dismissed appellants
free exercise contention in two sentences since no claim was made that individuals were
coerced in the practice of their religion.
53. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
54. L. 1965 c. 320 to be § 701 of the Education Law, effective Sept. 1, 1966.
55. New York Sess. Laws 1965, c. 320, § 1.
56. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, (1968).
The security and welfare of the nation require the fullest development of the
mental resources and skills of its youth. . . . It is hereby declared to be public
policy of the state that the public welfare and safety require that the state and
local communities give assistance to educational programs which are important to
our national defense and the general welfare of the state.
57. New York Education Laws § 701(3).
The books are loaned to the individual students on request. Title to the books remains
in the state.
58. The law has been construed by the New York Court of Appeals as allowing the
lending of only secular textbooks. Appellants did not contend that any books for religion
classes had been requested by individuals.
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of education in the state. 59 Thus, the Court concluded that it was the parent
and child who benefited from this program and not the school. This reasoning
accepts the child benefit doctrine as did the Court in Everson. The Court ac-
cepts the contention that but for the free textbooks some children would not at-
tend sectarian schools.60 However it cites Everson in saying that this result alone
does not demonstrate an unconstitutional support of religion in violation of the
establishment clause, any more than the furnishing of bus fares to parochial
school children in New Jersey violates the establishment clause.6' The Court
further reasoned that under Pierce v. Society of Sisters62 parents have a con-
stitutional right to send their children to church related schools as long as these
schools meet certain state requirements. Since the state's interest in secular edu-
cation is sufficiently accomplished in private schools, one cannot deny that secular
education and religious training can be carried out under one school roof. The
majority, while not denying that textbooks are an integral part of the teaching
process, was not persuaded that this relationship between textbooks, teaching
process and school requires or even admits of a finding of aid to religion.63 The
majority citing Pierce predicated a workable dichotomy between secular and
religious education indicating that the books furnished are employed only in the
pursuance of the first goal-secular education. 64 The Court concluded with the
general policy argument that private education plays a significant role in the
American educational scheme and is relied on by many Americans who place
education extremely high in the order of priorities.0 5
The crucial link in the majority's analysis is the conclusion that the primary
beneficiary under this law is the child attending school or his parent. This is an
adoption of the child benefit doctrine.66 This theory has been applied in other
cases where public funds were used to meet the educational needs of pupils at-
tending private sectarian schools.6 T The problem with this theory is limiting it
59. New York Education Laws § 701(3) sets out the requirements for lending the
textbooks.
60. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 242 (1968).
61. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947). The Court states that the
payment of bus fares by the state helps children to get to parochial school and in some
instances without such reimbursement, some parents might not send their children to
sectarian schools. But this result was not prohibited by the first amendment.
62. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
63. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236. Appellants tried to distinguish
Everson on the grounds that transportation is not critical to the teaching process but
textbooks are. Therefore when the state furnishes textbooks procured from public funds
it is aiding a religious school in its religious function.
64. Id. at 245.
65. Id. at 247.
66. Id. at 243-4.
67. Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946) The transportation
expenses of pupils attending parochial schools was paid for by the state. Borden v. Louisiana
State Board of Education, 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929). Textbooks were furnished to
all children regardless of the schools they attended. Adams v. County Commissioners of
St. Mary's County. 180 Md. 550, 26 A.2d 377 (1942). Parochial schools were reimbursed
by the state for transporting its students. Board of Education v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199 A.
628 (1938). Transportation was furnished to parochial school students. Chance v. Mississippi
State Textbook Rating & Purchasing Board, 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941). Textbooks
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within some kind of rational bounds. The court in Gurney v. Fegerson s pointed
to this very problem when it said:
It is true this use of public money and property aids the child, but it is
no less true that practically every proper expenditure for school pur-
poses aids the child. 69
Opponents of the child benefit doctrine contend that under its rationale public
funds could be used to erect parochial school buildings, pay the salaries of teach-
ers in these schools and defray the expenses of maintaining and operating the
school facility.70 This contention is logically sound. However, the Supreme Court
has apparently used a pragmatic test of who or what is being primarily benefited
in determining what is constitutionally permissible. The modifier primarily is
important because in a student-school relationship one cannot totally obliterate
one of the parties. The relationship is dynamic; what effects one of the com-
ponents must of necessity effect the other. Those who adhere to the child benefit
theory accept this relationship for what it is and look to the primary beneficiary
of the state aid. It is submitted that it is practical to say that those who concur
with the child benefit doctrine would find state appropriations for parochial school
teachers' salaries an establishment of religion and therefore prohibited by the
first amendment because of the nature and primary purpose of the aid.
Mr. Justice Fortas' dissenting opinion in Allen involves the mechanics of
selecting the textbooks to be used in the sectarian school. Apparently, the statute
would be constitutional in his view if the books to be loaned were chosen by the
public school authorities.71 He argues that because private school pupils are
loaned books selected by private school authorities, they are using special72
books which are not a part of a general program of loaning textbooks to all
children. Mr. Justice Fortas' opinion seemingly does not meet the issue under
adjudication. His opinion somehow assumes that religiously oriented textbooks
will be used by sectarian school pupils even though two criteria are established
within the statute requiring a public school board or official to approve the text-
were supplied to parochial students. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Parents were reimbursed for school transportation expenses regardless of the non-profit school
their children attended.
68. 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1942). This case concerned the use of public funds
to furnish transportation for children attending parochial schools.
69. Id., at 255, 122 P.2d at 1003.
70. The underlying assumption of the theory is that the child is not disqualified from
receiving those benefits which the state bestows on all children merely because he attends
a private sectarian school. The fact that the parochial school derives some benefit is thought
to be incidental. See R. Drinan, Religion And Courts And Public Policy 154 (1963).
71. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236. The textbooks are selected by the private
school using the following criteria which is in the state law:
Text-books which are designated for use in any public elementary or secondary
schools of the state or are approved by any boards of education, trustees or other
school authorities.
72. Id. at 271.
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book. 73 The majority states clearly that only secular textbooks may be ap-
proved.7 4
Mr. Justice Douglas traveled the same path as Mr. Justice Fortas but he
walked a much more circuitous and lengthy route. But at the end of his path
he viewed the same scenery: private school students using textbooks which are
sectarian in slant and which propagandized the doctrines of the particular reli-
gion which maintains the school.7 5 Douglas cited passages from a number of books
which are definitely not objective presentations of the subjects.76 He feared that
state authorities would not be able to differentiate between secular textbooks
and religiously oriented textbooks.77 But while these fears may be grounded in
fact, this does not mean that the statute itself is unconstitutional. It could mean
only that the manner in which the statute is implemented is unconstitutional and
this depends on proof that these kinds of textbooks are being requested by paro-
chial school students and loaned by the public school boards.
Mr. Justice Black argued that "books are the heart of hny school"78 and this
statute authorized financial aid in teaching and propagating sectarian religious
viewpoints.79 He made the basic assumption that the textbooks furnished to the
students will directly assist the teaching of religious ideology. Yet, it seem plaus-
ble to utilize his language relating to the transportation 80 situation in reference
to the textbook situation. Textbooks employed in sectarian schools need not
necessarily give religious slants to what would normally be identified as secular
subjects.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The constitution does not forbid all aid to religious institutions.8 ' It does
prohibit all aid to a religious function.8 2 The problem raised by the New York
Textbook Loan Law is whether this is an aid to a religious function. Those who
would consider this statute as a law respecting an establishment of religion con-
sider that the loaning of textbooks to students attending sectarian schools is
equivalent to financial support of such schools by the state. While Pierce v.
73. New York Education Laws § 701 (1967 Supp.) requires that textbook to be
loaned is either designated for use in any primary or secondary schools in the state or is
approved by any board of education, trustee or school authority in the state.
74. Board of Education v. Allen 392 U.S. 236, 245 (1968).
75. Id. at 262.
76. Id. at 258-61.
77. Id. at 257.
78. Id. at 253.
79. Id. at 252.
80. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947). The Court regarded such
general governmental services as police and fire protection as permissible aid to religious
institutions. Government neutrality is the touchstone. (330 U.S. at 18).
[The First] Amendment requires the state to be neutral in its relations with non-
believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no
more to be used so as to handicap religious than it is to favor them.
81. Cushman, Public Support of Religious Education in American Constitutional Law,
45 Ill. L. Rev. 333, 348 (1950).
82. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
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Society of Sisters88 settles the right of parents to educate their children in schools
which teach religious doctrines, the opponents of the Textbook Loan Law say
that this does not mean that the state must or may contribute funds to such
educational processes.
The proponents of the law view it as a general welfare measure completely
within the constitutional powers of the state. They consider the student as the
primary recipient of the aid and the school as an incidental beneficiary.
It is submitted that neither of these opposing views is dispositive of the
issue. We live in a pluralistic society which no longer fears an establishment of
a state religion as our forefathers did.84 Yet, as taxpayers and individuals,
professing various religious beliefs, we do not want our tax money used to
finance a school operation in which views repugnant to our own are taught.
However, we realize how important quality education is for the man of the
20th century. Less and less is he making a living by the sweat of his brow.
More and more, our society is demanding individuals with skills and technical
knowledge.
But how does this all relate to the constitutional requirements of the first
amendment? The interpretation of a "law respecting an establishment of
religion" must reflect the times we live in. The majority of the Court has not
accepted an absolute approach to the establishment clause.85 If the state can
show a valid reason for aiding the educational processes within a sectarian
school, it is submitted that the Court will conclude that there is no violation
of the establishment clause. This seems to be the rationale of the Everson and
Allen cases. The Court believed that both statutes in the above cases involve
public welfare legislation which embraces all school children regardless of the
school they attend. The improvement of the child's educational opportunities
was the purpose and intent of the legislation. The Court did not view these
statutes as aiding a religious function.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the establishment clause becomes
more important when we consider the federal government's vast financial
involvement in education: The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965. Until this year, federal taxpayers could not sue alleging unlawful federal
expenditures. 86 Now, the Court has carved out an exception to this rule in
Flast v. Cohen87 which holds that a federal taxpayer has standing to challenge
a federal statute on the ground that it violates the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Both Title 188 and Title II 80 of the
1965 Education Act provide certain benefits for children regardless of the
83. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
84. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
85. See Note, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 929 (1964).
86. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). The Court ruled that a federal
taxpayer does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a federal statute.
87. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
88. Id. at 86.
89. Id. at 86-7.
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school they attend. It is possible to suggest that the Supreme Court may view
this federal law in the same light as the New York Textbook Loan Law and
accordingly sustain its constitutionality.
HELEN M. KANEY
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION: CONDITIONAL TENDER BY CHECK
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Frequently, in commercial relations, a dispute arises as to the amount due
on an admittedly existing debt. Assume that A and B are engaged in the trading
of hay and that A has ordered five hundred bales at one dollar per bale. When
the hay arrives A discovers that there are only four hundred and fifty bales in the
shipment. Since A could have sold the missing fifty bales of hay at a profit of one
dollar per bale, he believes that one hundred dollars should be deducted from
his bill to B representing fifty dollars lost value of hay and fifty dollars lost
profit. B on the other hand reasons that only the cost of the missing hay-fifty
dollars-should be deducted from the purchase price. In an effort to compromise,
A subtracts seventy-five dollars from the debt and tenders a check marked
"payment in full." It is at this juncture that the legal problem, which this com-
ment considers, arises.
A tender upon the condition of full payment is often made when there is
a dispute as to the exact amount owed. In order to avoid litigation, or a con-
tinuing conflict, the debtor may submit a check for more than the amount he
thinks he owes but for less than the creditor claims is due.
The hypothetical above assumes the good faith of the debtor, which is
certainly not always the case. In an effort to examine the problem from both
sides, suppose that all five hundred bales arrive as ordered. A is unable to sell
all of the hay and as a result fifty bales remain unsold. A then writes to B
and claims that he ordered only four hundred and fifty bales, and as a result
of the excess shipment the other fifty bales have spoiled and are useless. He
sends a check for four hundred and fifty dollars to B marked "payment in full"
in the hope of escaping payment of what he justly owes.
If the debtor is tendering more than he believes is due in order to com-
promise, he wants to be assured that the check will either be accepted in full
payment or returned. He fears that the creditor will take advantage of him by
cashing the check and merely applying it to reduce the debt; to guard against
this prospect, the debtor marks his check "payment in full."
Upon receiving a check from a debtor stating that it is in full payment,
the creditor is confronted with a difficult problem. Naturally, he would prefer
to cash the check and still preserve his right to sue for the balance that he
believes is due. There is a possibility, however, that when the creditor sues for
